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Abstract—This position paper presents a synthesis viewpoint
of blockchains from two orthogonal perspectives: fault-tolerant
distributed systems and game theory. Specifically, we formulate a
new game-theoretical problem in the context of blockchains and
sketch a closed-form Nash equilibrium to the problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains have drawn much research interest, way be-
yond its first realization, Bitcoin [3], a cryptocurrency ap-
plication built upon blockchains. From system perspectives,
various facets, especially performance and scalability, have
been intensively studied by multiple computer systems com-
munities including but not limited to: computer security [7],
distributed systems [11], and database systems [9]. Works
on the theoretical foundation of blockchains are, however,
comparatively limited, and mostly in the cryptocurrency con-
text [6], [8], [10], usually in a permissionless setup where
nodes are free to join or leave the blockchain network. In
permissioned blockchains such as Hyperledger Fabric [2],
where Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerance [4] (PBFT) is the
de facto consensus protocol, much work focused on PBFT
and its variants without in-depth reasoning on the node’s
(or, user’s) rationality—analyses simply assume that a node
is either faulty or non-faulty. Admittedly, the emphasis of
reasoning about a node’s rationality is historically an area in
multi-agent systems and game theory.
This position paper envisions and advocates that a global-
scale, likely utility-incentive, blockchain system might be
better understood from a holistic view of multiple perspectives
as its theoretical foundation. As a starting point, we take
a hybrid approach of both distributed computing and game
theory to study blockchains. The inner-connection between
distributed computing and game theory dates back to 2011 [1],
which reviewed important commonality between, and more
importantly complimentary research methodologies shared by
two communities, both of which parallelly concentrated on
distributed irrational-machine systems and utility-maximizing
multi-agent systems, respectively. We will articulate the mod-
els of our approach in §II, formulate the Blockchain Game
in §III problem, sketch one possible Nash equilibrium for the
problem and discuss open questions in §IV.
II. MODELS
We illustrate the Blockchain Game in Figure 1. There
are three type of nodes1 involved in a blockchain game:
1Also called players (game theory), users (databases), or participants
(distributed systems), depending on various contexts.
a good citizen (C) who always votes for the proposal, a
terrorist (T) who always votes against the proposal, and an
adventurer (A) who makes her decision to maximize the utility
(either voting for (Ag) or against (Ab) the proposed value, i.e.,
A = Ag ∪ Ab). A proposal could be a proposed value in a
permissioned blockchain or a newly-mined block to be verified
by a permissionless blockchain.
Fig. 1. The blockchain game can be viewed from two orthogonal perspectives:
Byzantine distributed systems and game theory.
We use N = C ∪ T ∪ A to denote the entire set of nodes,
and use n = |N | the cardinality of the node set. We will use
t = |T| to denote the cardinality of the terrorist set T, c = |C|
to denote the cardinality of the citizen set C, and g = |Ag| and
b = |Ab| for the two subsets’ cardinalities, respectively.
III. THE BLOCKCHAIN GAME
A. Normal Game Strategies
In the real world, a distributed system, including
blockchains, usually adopts a timeout mechanism that sets
some unresponsive nodes to a default value, such as null
or nil. From a pure system point of view, an abstain vote
is not different than a no vote—the system takes a very
conservative position in interpreting the responses. In the case
of blockchains, therefore, the consensus protocol interprets an
abstain vote as a no vote. Formally, we have two pure strate-
gies for all the n nodes in the blockchain: Si = {Yes, No},
0 ≤ i < n.
In blockchains, it takes a simple quorum mechanism to
move forward. In permissionless blockchains (Bitcoin [3],
Ethereum [5]), the longest list of transactions will overwrite
the shorter ones and the system is considered stable as long as
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no more than 51% nodes are controlled or compromised (i.e.,
g + c > b + t). In permissioned blockchains (Hyperledger
Fabric [2] and other variants based on PBFT [4]), non-
faculty nodes need to outnumber the faulty nodes by at least
200%. The following discussion assumes the blockchain is
permissionless for the sake of space.
If the system is not compromised, the non-faulty nodes will
continue to work on “agreeing” on the next proposed value
and get rewarded by a transaction fee, and the faulty nodes
might be forced to leave the network; Otherwise, the faulty
nodes overturn the existing network and collect a high reward,
leaving the “honest” nodes’ work worthless. Note that we
neglect the cost (e.g., electricity, hardware procurement, space
rental) for mining blocks or attacking the network. Formally,
the payoff function for a non-faulty node un : Ag ∪ C 7→ R is
defined as follows:
un ,
{ pn
g + c , if g + c > b+ t
0, otherwise
(1)
where pn denotes the overall payoff of a winning “honest”
nodes and n denotes that winning non-faulty node, i.e., n ∈
Ag∪C. Statistically, each “honest” node receives png + c payoff.
Similarly, we have the payoff for a faulty node (but not a
terrorist) as follows:
uf ,
{pf
b
, if g + c ≤ b+ t
0, otherwise
(2)
where pf denotes the overall payoff of all “deviating” nodes
and f denotes a faulty node, i.e., f ∈ Ab.
B. Zero-Sum among Non-Terrorist Nodes
An important observation is that all the non-terrorist nodes
constitute a zero-sum game. That is, the Byzantine nodes, or
terrorists, are disinterested in the expense or utility incurred in
the game—the only objective is to sabotage the network. As
a consequence, we have the following invariant:
0 ≡ c · pn + g · pn − b · pf (3)
where the first term indicates the payoff for good citizen, the
second term indicates the payoff for adventurers who vote for
the proposal, the third term indicates the payoff for adventurers
who vote against the proposal.
C. Consensus Protocols
There are rich literature in handling arbitrary nodes in the
distributed system community. In the context of blockchains,
there are two main categories of consensus protocols by
which the participating reach an agreement: (i) Proof-of-Work
(PoW) and its variants for permissionless blockchains; (ii)
PBFT for permissioned blockchains. Again, we will focus on
permissionless blockchains in this paper.
Permissionless blockchains require that the number of non-
faulty nodes is strictly larger than that of faulty nodes. There-
fore, we set the difference as one between the two cliques as
the borderline case in the following discussion:
c+ g ≥ 1 + t+ b (4)
D. Blockchain Game
With all the aforementioned preliminaries, we are ready to
define a general blockchain system and the associated game.
Definition III.1 (Blockchain System). A blockchain system
B is represented as a tuple B = 〈N ,S,P〉, where N denotes
the set of all nodes (or, players), S denotes the set of strategies
and associated payoffs available for the nodes, and P denotes
the consensus protocol among the nodes.
Definition III.2 (Blockchain Game). In a blockchain system
B, each adventurer node in N of a blockchain maximizes its
utility according to S without violating P .
Essentially, the rational players would choose between
being part of either Ag or Ab, exclusively, such that her utility
is maximized under multiple constraints, i.e., equations 1–4.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
Since the Blockchain Game exhibits a finite number of
players and strategies, there must exist at least one Nash
equilibrium. Obviously, the solution to the above equations
represents one such equilibrium. Due to limited space, we sim-
ply give the closed-form solution without numerical analysis:g
∗ = 1 + t1− γ − c
b∗ = γ · (1 + t)1− γ
(5)
where γ = pnpf . Note that in the real world, pf is, usually,
significantly larger than pn, implying that 0 < γ << 1. We
call this variable reciprocal risk factor (RRF), indicating the
payoff ratio of a compliant action over a deviating action.
It should be clear that the results are for permissionless
blockchains only, although a similar one can be obtained for
permissioned blockchains as well. It should also be noted that
the discussion so far is limited to a normal game, which is
played by the nodes only once. We leave extensive-form game
that counts times as an open question and our future work.
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